TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/122391/1223001.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 22.6 KB | 520 lines

                                                                                WORLD, Page 24

COVER STORIES

"I Want to Stay the Course"


In an exclusive interview, a determined Gorbachev shows he is
not ready to disappear gently into the pages of history

By JOHN KOHAN and STROBE TALBOTT/MOSCOW and Mikhail Gorbachev


    It was a stunning transformation. The Mikhail Gorbachev
who had appeared on Soviet television Thursday evening was a
defeated man -- exhausted, disgusted, frustrated, fed up, ready
to quit. Even the commentator on the relatively pro-Gorbachev
state TV network described the performance as having the look
and feel of a "farewell interview."

    But the next afternoon it was a different man who received
TIME for the magazine's third interview in five years. Gorba
chev had clearly decided to use the session to counteract the
widespread impression that his presidency was mortally wounded
by what several of his advisers had earlier in the week called
the "second coup."

    Far from throwing in the towel, Gorbachev came out
fighting, lambasting the leaders of Russia, Belorussia and
Ukraine for their declaration of a "commonwealth" to replace the
U.S.S.R. Yet in classic fashion Gorbachev managed to combine
conciliation with combativeness.

    Essentially he reiterated the case against the
commonwealth -- then offered to help bring it about. Gorbachev
still saw himself as the indispensable man, the only figure on
the political stage who can avert civil war, who can keep the
army under control, who can bring Slavs and Muslims together,
who can prevent the hungry, angry, impatient populace from
pouring into the streets and providing a pretext for another
rightist coup.

    There were, as a good Marxist might say, contradictions in
Gorbachev's claim to leadership of a cause that represents a
repudiation of him personally, a cause he continues to denigrate
as not in the country's best interests. But the performance was
nothing less than a tour de force. He was at his most formidable
steamrolling over the gaps and rough spots in the logic of his
own position.

    The TIME group arrived at the Kremlin's old Council of
Ministers building just as the sun was setting at 3 p.m. The
white-blue-and-red Russian flag was flying over the building
next door, a colorful reminder of how Russian President Boris
Yeltsin's political power is impinging on Gorbachev's, including
the takeover of several properties.

    The Soviet leader held forth in the same cavernous office,
with its blond parquet floors and off-white damask walls with
teakwood trim and wainscoting, where the previous TIME interview
took place, in May 1990. There was barely a trace of the bags
that had been so apparent under his eyes on TV the night
before. He looked rested, smiled frequently, radiated energy,
frequently karate-chopped the air or formed a fist to make a
point, hooked his right thumb into his chest when referring to
himself and several times rattled the china coffee cups in his
vehemence. At one point, when describing how "the country is
worried," he thrust his hands in the air like the victim of a
stickup.

    While Gorbachev commented at one point that he spends more
time asking questions these days than answering them, this is
someone who enjoys talking much more than listening. Once again,
he was the world champion of eye contact.

    At the end of the 80-minute session, his guests said they
had come expecting that they might witness the last interview
he granted as President. Gorbachev laughed heartily at the
seeming absurdity of such an idea.


    Q. Our magazine comes out on Monday. Will you still be the
President of the Soviet Union then?

    A. On Monday? I'm sure I will.

    The process now under way is getting us back on the track
of creating a new union. We were moving along that track until
the referendum in Ukraine created a new situation. I had argued
that Ukraine, on the basis of its sovereignty, could find its
own place in a new union. The leadership there had signed an
economic-cooperation agreement. That was the right thing to do.
[President Leonid] Kravchuk had also said several times that
nuclear weapons should be under rigid control and a single
command. Of course, all republics on whose territory nuclear
weapons are located should have some say in how that control is
implemented, but no one has challenged the idea that there
should be a single authority. Those are two very important
points, and they make it possible for us still to have some sort
of political union.

    I've worried all along that it would be dangerous for
Ukraine to end up outside the process. My concern was that the
Russian leadership would use what the Ukrainians were doing as
a pretext [to thwart Gorbachev's plan for a new union].

    The decision to separate [the Slavic republics from the
union] was unconvincing, ill founded, badly formulated. I'm all
in favor of profound reform and the redistribution of
authority, but [the Slavic leaders] decided on separation, and
that's a huge mistake. If we start tearing this country apart,
it will just be more difficult for us to come to terms with one
another. They think they have speeded up the process, but in
reality we're in danger of getting bogged down in all sorts of
wrangles.

    My point is that while we've got to redistribute
authority, there are dangers. It's important that we not wander
off the best political course.


    Q. You seem much more determined to continue in office
than you did on television Thursday when you used the word
resignation repeatedly.

    A. If other republics come to a common understanding that
they want to form a commonwealth, then I -- as someone
dedicated to the principles of democracy and constitutional
rule, and because of my convictions and my role as President --
will have to respect that choice.

    But I want a stage-by-stage, step-by-step process that
will not stimulate disintegration and chaos. That doesn't mean
I've changed my position. I've given this a lot of thought and
analyzed my own position quite critically. Perhaps I've
overlooked something. I'm capable of self-analysis. I've always
been that way. But so far I haven't heard any arguments that
make me want to change my position. The political process should
continue without interference and within the framework of the
constitution.

    It's critical that we not lose control of the situation.
Therefore, I'll use my powers as President, first of all as
commander in chief of the armed forces. That is why [Russian
President Boris] Yeltsin and I have each met with the leaders
of the armed forces. I told them that during this period of
transition the army can be sure we'll deal with all these
questions -- the creation of a new defense union, the control
of strategic forces, and what to do about national armies. The
armed forces should be assured that they'll be taken care of,
that they constitute an important institution of the state and
that they can't be the object of political manipulation.


    Q. Do you still believe it's possible to save the Soviet
Union as such?

    A. I wish that were possible, but I have my doubts. I
don't think the commonwealth is more promising than the proposed
union treaty.

    Look here. [He pulls a three-page typed document from a
pink folder with a red tag saying URGENT.] It's a report on
the supreme soviet of Ukraine discussing the Minsk agreement;
they ratified it without discussion, then added several
amendments attaching conditions to the guarantees in the
original document about open borders, freedom of movement and
free exchange of information. So you see what's starting to
happen already?


    Q. Can you guarantee that during this period of transition
you will keep control over the nuclear button?

    A. Absolutely, absolutely. Everything will remain as it
has always been. Any alarming speculation, here or abroad,
about who will have his finger on the button is groundless.


    Q. But what about the notion, raised in Brest, of joint
command?

    A. We'll deal with that in due course. I can guarantee
that everything will turn out all right. I talked with Yeltsin
today, and he said to me, "Mikhail Sergeyevich, as far as I am
concerned, there will be no actions on my part that will lead
to confusion in the armed forces."

    But the more immediate question is this: Kravchuk has
named himself commander-in-chief of the armed forces deployed
in the [Ukrainian] republic. However, he left out strategic
[nuclear] forces. I put in a call to him on my secret line and
said, "Do you know what you're doing? You're undermining the
whole process."

    Kravchuk told me, "I assure you, nothing will change with
regard to strategic forces." I told him, "You should announce
publicly that until a new defense treaty is signed, there will
be no hasty decisions regarding the armed forces, and that the
military will stay under a single command and under my control.
Don't go introducing uncertainty into these matters! The whole
world is watching. Don't confuse people!"

    Kravchuk and I agreed that everything will be decided
mutually and in stages. I've just sent Defense Minister Yevgeni
Sha poshnikov to Kiev to work out procedures for the
transition. In fact, nothing has changed so far as the armed
forces are concerned. You Americans have nothing to worry about.


    Q. We've heard many terms: union, confederation,
commonwealth. You talk about a "soft" union. What do you mean?

    A. You may have noticed that these days I'm more often
asking my colleagues questions than I am providing my own
answers. It is a touchy situation. I don't want to appear to be
imposing anything on them. There's this false impression around
that Gorbachev is trying to revive the old center and the old
structures. But in fact those things don't exist anymore.

    I had some questions for Yeltsin when he came to see me on
Monday. "It's not clear to me what kind of commonwealth you're
setting up," I said. "Both politically and legally, it's just
a concept, a sketch, inviting all sorts of doubts and
questions."

    Nonetheless, I tried to make it clear to my comrades from
the outset that there were some positive aspects to the Minsk
agreement. If you compare the economic part of the union treaty
with the agreement, you'll see they're identical.

    At the same time, I thought I should also point out the
negatives. Those three republics have no right to declare the
Soviet Union nonexistent. What do they mean, there's no such
country as the U.S.S.R., not even as an object of international
law? If there are no laws governing the union as a whole, then
who controls the army? The borders of our state have also been
established by union law. The same with our territorial waters
and airspace, not to mention our relations with foreign
countries.

    What kind of democrats are these? How can they even call
themselves democrats? What about our shared commitment to
develop a state governed by law? I said all this to them, and
it sobered them up a bit.

    They tell me that back in '37, a troika [a three-man
kangaroo court common during the purges of the Stalinist
terror] could decide a person's fate. And now a troika is
deciding the fate of entire nations!


    Q. The authors of the Minsk agreement have interpreted
some statements from Washington as support for their position.
What is your view?

    A. President Bush and Secretary of State Baker are the two
most important people for me on the American side. On the
whole, I have always considered their policy to be constructive
and supportive. They consider the process taking place in this
country as our internal affair.

    But the U.S. took some steps recently, particularly on the
eve of the referendum in Ukraine, that, I must say, were not
well thought out. They were regarded by some here as attempts
to stimulate separatism in Ukraine. I told the President this
when we talked on the telephone.

    I wish that all our partners would adopt a balanced,
patient approach in their relations with us, especially now. Mr.
Baker was overly hasty in saying, "The Soviet Union no longer
exists." Things are in flux here. While we're still trying to
figure things out, the U.S. seems to know everything already!
I don't think that's loyalty, particularly toward those of us
who favor partnership and full-fledged cooperation. It is in our
common interest that this process should end successfully
without any surprises.


    Q. You still enjoy popularity and prestige abroad. Does
this help in your talks with leaders of the republics?

    A. We deal with each other as partners, not like
gladiators stepping into the arena. I am even tempered and have
a reserve of constructive ideas, which is by no means exhausted.

    Yesterday I sent a message to the parliaments of Russia
and Belorussia informing them they had made a mistake in
deciding to recall their deputies from the Supreme Soviet of the
U.S.S.R. I said, "If you continue to act like that, you'll get
a reputation for doing things in secret and sidestepping the
constitutional bodies of the country. If that happens, the rest
of the world is going to wonder what kind of people it is
dealing with. You'll be nothing but a bunch of bandit reformers.
Who will respect you if you can't respect your own
constitution?"


    Q. What if they all just ignore you?

    A. They pay attention. In fact, we've been talking for
days. I can't let myself worry about being insulted. We're
trying to meet each other halfway. We've got to really think
this through and not improvise. I'll use all my political and
legal authority to enrich this process -- even though it's a
process I don't recognize.

    By interacting with my colleagues, I'll try to let them
know what my position is and help them to come together and
reach agreements. But I don't want to be like the guest of honor
at a banquet. I don't see that as my role. What I want to do is
participate in formulating the framework of the commonwealth and
giving it substance.

    The ideas in the union treaty and the commonwealth
agreement are coming together. Many parts of the union treaty
will be used: the big difference is that this will be a
commonwealth of states and not a single state.

    I thought, and still think, that a softer union, with some
of the institutions I was proposing, would be a better way. But
unfortunately we've already shattered the links among the
republics, and the national economy is collapsing. An amorphous
commonwealth won't bring about the kind of cooperation we need,
which is why I think it's a mistaken concept. But I want to make
it a half-mistake rather than a full mistake.


    Q. What is your relationship with Yeltsin really like?

    A. We've parted company over basic concepts. I'm for the
preservation of the union as a country. I'm against what I've
described as the pie being sliced up and served with tea.
[Gorbachev doodles on a pad; what emerges is a picture of a pie
with crisscross lines through it.] Who has the right to cut
this country into pieces?

    If the process leads to the establishment of a
commonwealth, I'll accept it as a reality. Even though I don't
share their concept of what's required, I wish them success. But
I don't want this question to be decided on the streets, and
I'll use my authority to see to it that the process goes forward
normally and constitutionally.

    At the same time, I am still firmly convinced we are
making a mistake. I'd rather be proved triply wrong. But I want
to stay the course. If the process gets out of hand, then I'll
have buried everything to which I've devoted the best years of
my life.


    Q. Last night you were obviously furious with Yeltsin.

    A. Look at the way Yeltsin behaved. We handled the whole
union-treaty process together, sent it to the republics and
suddenly Yeltsin comes up with a different approach in Brest.
I cannot accept this. He didn't even call me. I found out that
he had talked with George Bush and not to me. There was no need
to draw Bush into this. It's a question of Yeltsin's moral
standards. I cannot approve or justify this style of behavior.
It's inadmissible.


    Q. Then what basis do you have for a partnership with
Yeltsin?

    A. There are higher interests that should unite us.
Gorbachev and Yeltsin simply cannot get away from that.


    Q. Does Yeltsin agree about these higher interests?

    A. Unquestionably. On a human level there are no obstacles
in the way of having a dialogue with him. We have drifted apart
on this conceptual question of a commonwealth.

    Who knows? Maybe I am wrong. But I am firmly convinced
that I am right.That shouldn't stop us from cooperating, as far
as I am concerned. I hope he feels the same way.


    Q. How can the West help the process of reform?

    A. We need your help now. Immediately. Stop hesitating or
we will all have to pay a greater price in the end. You should
promote reform in the commonwealth and, first of all, in
Russia. They need urgent help in the form of hard currency to
provide consumer goods for the market and speed up the move
toward a convertible ruble. They want to move faster, but they
cannot do so without a stabilizing fund of several billion
dollars. If you have given aid to Poland and Hungary, Russia
certainly deserves it.


    Q. Can help from the West really change the situation of
people waiting out there in lines?

    A. You are right. This is the result of the enormous mass
of money in circulation and an imbalance between supply and
demand. Those who have money can afford to buy expensive
sausage. Those who don't must wait in line for goods sold at
state-controlled prices. But prices will have to be fixed for
certain goods, so that poorer people can afford them.


    Q. Won't the republics' bureaucracies simply take the
place of the old union bureaucracy?

    A. The republics were fervent fighters, wanting to destroy
the center and take over its functions. But as soon as they
succeeded, the reform process abruptly stopped.


    Q. Is there a danger of another coup?

    A. It is our responsibility to see that this doesn't
happen. I think a military coup is out of the question. Neither
I nor Yeltsin nor the democrats would resort to this. It is just
not acceptable.

    But there may have to be firmness and tough enforcement of
law and discipline. A strengthening of executive power -- not
a dictatorship -- is necessary during this transitional period.
The conservatives and reactionaries, after their defeat, are
gathering strength and hoping to take advantage of the
country's difficulties. There is a lot of discontent, which can
be channeled in a certain direction. But they will be unable to
get the army to rise up in a putsch.

    If we have achieved anything both inside this country and
in the world at large, it was only when we used political
means. That is not to rule out emergency measures in emergency
situations, particularly when there is a threat to the security
of the country. Where might the biggest threat come from? If the
market situation deteriorates even further, if factories are
shut down, then it will lead to further decline and will force
people out into the streets with political demands.

    However, whenever people take to the streets, immediately
all kinds of political manipulators and adventurists will take
advantage of the situation for their own ends. Our most pressing
task is to prevent this, no matter what party anyone belongs
to. That's why we should direct aid to those areas where the
tension is greatest: Moscow, Leningrad and the Urals.


    Q. Can you name those who might take advantage of the
situation?

    A. I think they are from the old structures where
conservative elements were concentrated. They were at various
levels of the party apparatus, in the administrative bureaucracy
and in the military-industrial complex.


    Q. What about the KGB?

    A. I wouldn't worry about them. The intelligence service
has been split [into foreign and domestic branches] so that
it operates as a normal agency in any civilized state. The
border guards have been taken out of the structure. So have
communication facilities. KGB chief Vadim Bakatin heads the
counterintelligence service, but its functions are entirely
different now. Perhaps there are individuals there who could
cause trouble, but not the organization as such.


    Q. President Bush does not want to have to choose between
Gorbachev and Yeltsin. How can he avoid this?

    A. I think he should make his position very clear. Life
has brought to the forefront a new generation of politicians.
There is a danger that at a crucial time of change, when our --
and your -- destinies are being decided, some politicians are
just entering the world of big-time politics. I have encouraged
them to travel abroad. I wanted our partners to size up these
new politicians. Maybe they did not see this as a tactical move
by Gorbachev. They thought that since Gorbachev was sending them
around, it meant he, himself, was finished and they should now
deal with them -- and they made a wrong choice.

    These new politicians will have to shoulder
responsibilities, but they need seasoning. They may find it
difficult to work with Gorbachev, who has already been through
a great deal and has been tested and steeled by experience. Many
of these new politicians are still populists. They have not
shown themselves to be creative people. They need to prove
themselves. They have to learn to adapt to things, rather than
throw tantrums.

    What are personal ambitions worth, if they interfere and
slow down your chosen course? They're now accusing Gorbachev of
slowing down, of applying the brakes to the creation of this new
association of states. But I'm going to stay the course. Despite
my ability to be flexible, I'm not going to give up my
principles. There's a line I will not cross. I'm not going to
swing back and forth like a pendulum.


    Q. We came in here today thinking this might be the last
interview with Gorbachev as President, but from the way you
talk, it doesn't sound like that.

    A. As far as my work is concerned, the main purpose of my
life has already been fulfilled. I feel at peace with myself.
I've lived through such experiences that I feel absolutely
free. At the same time, I feel that the capital I've accumulated
should be fully used for the freedom of my country and
international relations. And I feel strong enough to go on.